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MODELS FOR A GORBACHEV
CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R.
John N. Hazard*
Western Sovietologists were startled when Secretary General
Mikhail S. Gorbachev set his craftsmen to work in the Summer of
1988 to prepare a revised structure for the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics ("U.S.S.R.").' While some hint of what was to come had
been given by publications prior to the 19th Communist Party Confer-
ence, and while some of these appeared in the theses to be debated at
the Conference, 2 Westerners expected little more than a call from the
tribune for change in attitudes. Basic State structures established by
Leonid Brezhnev in his 1977 Constitution had not previously been
questioned. Critics levelled their complaints at what they saw as dis-
tortion of the governing process by corrupt Communist Party politi-
cians and at bureaucrats in both the Party and State apparatuses.
They charged that these bureaucrats had lacked the initiative in utiliz-
ing Constitutional forms effectively during what Gorbachev called the
Brezhnev era of "stagnation." Gorbachev's solution to difficulties
seemed to be limited to development of new leadership that would be
honest and imaginative within the Brezhnev framework. He seemed
to plan no major restructuring of the legislative, executive or judicial
organs of the State, nor a change in the relationship of the State to the
Communist Party.
With such limited expectations of constitutional change,
Gorbachev's long speech at the Party Conference seems to have come
as a shock not only to Western analysts but also to the rank and file
Party members who sat on the benches. Only a handful of Politburo
members and Party Secretaries appears to have been aware of the ex-
tent to which constitutional structures would be changed. The public
is said to have gasped as the Secretary General unfolded his plans, for
* B.A. 1930, Yale University; LL.B. 1934, Harvard University; Certificate, 1937, Moscow
Juridical Institute; J.S.D. 1939, University of Chicago. Nash Professor Emeritus of Law, Colum-
bia University. Member of the W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet
Union.
1. See generally Izvestia, June 29, 1988, at 2-7; Pravda, June 29, 1988 at 2-7 (speech of M.S.
Gorbachev to 19th Communist Party Conference), translated in 50 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET
PRESS, July 27, 1988, at 7.
2. For theses presented to the 19th Communist Party Conference, see Izvestia, May 27, 1988,
at 1-2; Pravda, May 27, 1988, at 1-3, translated in 50 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, June 22,
1988, at 1.
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they departed sharply from constitutional structures developed in
1936 by Joseph Stalin in revision of Lenin's constitutional model of
1923.3 Gorbachev's remarks suggest that he had in mind a return in
part to Lenin's constitutional structure mixed with a few innovations
which had been developed in Eastern European Constitutions since
Stalin's death in 1953. There were also hints that Gorbachev had
glanced at structures in Western democracies as well.
As an example of the latter, a French journalist picked out the
proposal to create a strong Presidency, and he thought it a reflection
of deGaulle's post-World War II Fifth Republic. 4 Likewise, a British
journalist thought the proposals resulted from the fact that Gorbachev
had been impressed by Ronald Reagan's political power as an inde-
pendently-elected national president, 5 which seemed attractive as cre-
ating executive strength far beyond that of the chairman of the
collective head of the State in the U.S.S.R., often called a "presidency"
in descriptions of the Soviet system of government.
In light of these suggestions that Gorbachev's proposals have been
based on models taken from the Soviet past and from abroad, it may
be appropriate in honor of the late William W. Bishop, long a col-
league in activities of the American Society of International Law, to
review constitutional history among the Russians and to make com-
parisons with some Western models. This could provide a basis for
speculation as to what Gorbachev seeks to avoid and what he proposes
to emulate.
THE BEGINNINGS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN RUSSIA
Constitutional history in Soviet Russia may be said to begin with
Lenin's appointment of a constitutional drafting commission soon af-
ter the Communist Party's seizure of power in January 1918, after
barring entrance to the Constitutional Assembly gathered in Russia's
Capital, Petrograd. Although that step marked a formal beginning of
a new era, earlier events in the Russian Empire indubitably had estab-
lished a spiritual beginning of Lenin's constitutionalism, despite deni-
als from Communists of the time. As a subject of the Tsar and a
member of the Petrograd Bar, he knew what he wanted to avoid, and
3. See generally A. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR: A GUIDE TO
THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS (London 1981) (English translations of all Soviet Constitutions).
4. See the unsigned analysis of Gorbachev's proposals at the 19th Communist Party Confer-
ence, entitled Changer de rdgime sans changer de systime, Le Monde, June 30, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
5. See the unsigned analysis of Gorbachev's proposals at the 19th Communist Party Confer-
ence, entitled Gorbachev's views of a new socialist revolution, The Independent (London), June 29,
1988, at 1.
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he knew what his people hoped to achieve with their new government.
Constitutionalism had long been in the air in the Russian Empire.
Westerners tend to forget this fact when they think of the last Tsar,
Nicholas II. A tradition of constitutionalism had been developing for
over a century, led at times by the monarch and supported by intellec-
tuals and even the westernized nobility. Even the masses had been
developing a craving for legality, and Lenin understood this craving.
His drafting commission was appointed to respond to it, although
within the framework of the Marxist program he was committed to
introduce.
The popular yearning for constitutional government drew in part
upon what was happening abroad. To Americans, it may come as a
surprise that the fledgling United States of the 18th Century played a
part in the thought of Russian leaders. Both nobility and Tsars had on
their library shelves the same books as the leaders of political thought
in the restless English colonies of North America. John Locke and
Voltaire were being read in the palace at St. Petersburg as well as in
the mansions of Virginia. The Empress Catherine is reported to have
been influenced so greatly by Western thought that she commanded
her scholars to prepare what has come down in history as her Bolshoi
Nakaz to guide the commission in drafting a "Basic Law" for her Em-
pire.6 This notable document was considered so liberal that the
French King Louis XV banned it from his kingdom, and copies were
confiscated when they reached the frontier.
Catherine's first move toward Constitutionalism aborted when she
took fright at the widespread peasant revolts of 1773-74, but the seed
had been planted. In calmer times a few years later at the turn of the
19th Century, Tsar Alexander I began correspondence with Thomas
Jefferson and studied the American and French revolutions. In 1809
he commissioned Count Michael M. Speranski to draft a "Basic Law."
The Count prepared a model which called for a hierarchy of popular
assemblies leading up to a two-chambered parliament structured in a
measure on the English model. One house was to be elected, albeit
from a limited electorate; the other was to be appointed by the Tsar to
become a "State Council." In 1810 the State Council was put in place
to provide the Tsar with a group of advisors on whom he could rely in
developing his political programs. The other house, the Duma, did
not eventuate for nearly a century, but the reform movement begun by
Alexander did not die, although the general public of the time was
hardly aware of its content.
6. See M. FLORINSKY, RUSSIA: A HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION (New York 1953).
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This lack of knowledge became evident on Alexander's death. An
incident occurred in the palace square in the form of a demonstration.
It seems that the Tsar had secretly arranged for his eldest son, Con-
stantine, to step aside in favor of his younger brother, Nicholas, in the
event of Alexander's death. Nicholas had not been advised of the
plan, nor had the public, which had hoped that Constantine on as-
cending the throne would give them the Constitution for which they
yearned. Consequently, when Constantine did not step in immediately
following his father's death, some hopefuls organized a demonstration
in which the crowd chanted "Konstantin i Konstitutsiia." A British
historian has reported wryly that some of the participants knew so
little about a Constitution that they thought that the second word in
the chant was the name of Constantine's wife - as well they might
since it was in the feminine gender, and the Russian language knows
no definite article to indicate the difference between a thing and a
person. 7
Humorous as this evidence of ignorance of constitutions seems, the
cause of constitutionalism was not defended by know-nothings. Con-
stitutionalism was sponsored even in the palace, for before death Alex-
ander had commanded N.N. Novosiltsev to draft a constitution for a
federal State to unite the heartland of the Russian Empire with its
accessions, Finland, Poland, the Baltic Provinces, and the Cossack ter-
ritories along the Don River. Novosiltsev had before him the Ameri-
can federal model, but his plan aborted because of new fear of
revolution. This time the threat came not from the peasants, as in
Catherine's time, but from the Army officers who had accompanied
Alexander to Paris as his staff when he joined with the other victors
over Napoleon to prepare a peace.
The staff officers had been influenced in Paris by the constitutional
forms found in the West, and they chose the moment of confusion
over succession following Alexander's death to demand reform. When
the Military Governor of St. Petersburg advanced toward their assem-
blage before the palace to negotiate, he was shot. Nicholas I, the new
Tsar, rallied loyal troops and suppressed the uprising, whose partici-
pants came to be known in history as the "Decembrists." Some were
imprisoned, others were exiled to Siberia.8
Although constitutionalism was threatened as a goal after this
event, the broaching of it was not outlawed. Nicholas I ordered his
father's specialist Speransky in 1832 to gather all the Imperial re-
7. See B. PARES, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 318 (New York 1947).
8. For a full account of the "Decembrists," see M. RAEFF, THE DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966).
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scripts issued since 1649. This he did, and in later years they were
printed in a multi-volume set, the Polnoe Sopranie, from which they
were later selected to create a classified short set of laws in effect, the
Svod Zakonov. While not a constitution, the Polnoe Sopranie and the
Svod Zakonov were steps toward regularization of the legal basis of
Imperial power. There was to be no diminution of the Monarch's role,
for the principle of autocracy was reaffirmed.
Thirty years were to pass before major reforms were again set in
motion. The dramatic event was the emancipation of the serfs in 1861
by Alexander II, in the very year of emancipation of slaves in the
United States. In developing his accompanying reforms, Alexander II
established local government with some independence by granting to
each province authority to form a Zemstvo, which was to assume re-
sponsibility for establishing schools, medical services, and local roads.
Alexander II also restructured the judiciary on Western models, intro-
ducing juries for serious criminal cases and a formal Bar. 9
The Zemstvo assemblies were to be elected from the private land-
owners, the peasant communes, and the townspeople, each curia hav-
ing its own deputies who were elected separately by the members of
that curia. In 1870, the Zemstvo local government system was ex-
tended to the large cities, but the votes could be deposited only by
taxpayers. Each group, as determined by the tax bracket within which
its members fell, was to elect its own deputies.
Alexander II moved further in the direction of popular participa-
tion in government when he commanded his Minister of Interior, Lo-
ris Melikov, to start once more on a draft of a "Basic Law." On
March 13, 1881, the Tsar signed an Ukaz establishing a representative
committee to advise the State council, which had continued to func-
tion since establishment by the Tsar's grandfather, Alexander I. The
concession was said to be an attempt to placate the moderate classes so
as to gain support against the developing revolutionary activity.
Again the axe fell on the plan: on the afternoon of the very same day
of the Ukaz Alexander II was assassinated. When his son ascended
the throne as Alexander III, he withdrew his father's concession of a
"Basic Law," and the Ukaz was not published officially.
REVOLUTION FORCES REFORM
Alexander III's reversal of the emerging trend toward Constitu-
tionalism left his heir, Nicholas II, to face revolution without a struc-
9. For an account of the great reform, see S. KUCHEROV, COURTS, LAWYERS AND TRIALS
UNDER THE LAST THREE TSARS (New York 1953).
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ture through which he might have moderated demands for reform. By
1905 the revolutionary spirit had inspired great numbers of people to
protest autocracy, and the demands for some form of limitations on
absolute power were pressed upon the Tsar. Even the nobility was
aroused, but the new element was emerging out of the extreme left,
claiming socialism as its creed. The militant socialists, the Marxists,
attempted to form a revolutionary party at a Congress called for the
City of Minsk in 1898, but they were thwarted by arrest. Not until
1903 did they try again, and this time they took the precaution of
meeting outside of the Empire. A "Russian Social Democratic Labor
Party" was founded in London. Within it were two factions, Menshe-
vik and Bolshevik, which were to play separate roles as the years ad-
vanced toward 1917.10
Demands for a constitution accelerated. The year 1905 began with
a demonstration before the Winter Palace on January 22, led by a
moderate priest, Father Gapon, whose sympathies for the problems of
his parishioners had been aroused. The Tsar reacted savagely, calling
out his Cossacks and making one of the greatest mistakes of his reign.
Demonstrators were killed and the day came to be called "Bloody
Sunday" in the pages of history. Although the effort failed, the event
produced other pressures, leading the Tsar to the conclusion that he
must respond to the growing unrest. In August 1905 he created by
Imperial rescript an Imperial Duma patterned on Speranski's century-
old plan. Yet, the franchise was to be limited to exclude the working
people who paid no lodger's tax. Further it was to be only deliberative
and not a Western style legislature.
In protest against these limitations, the socialist parties,which had
been developing since the turn of the century, gaining in strength not
only among the workmen but among peasants, called a general strike.
In the cities, in order to coordinate efforts of strikers, committees,
called soviets, were formed. Thus came into existence a form and a
name that were utilized later in 1917 to become the mass base for an
organization on which Lenin could lean to provide the popular foun-
dation for his new government, and to which Gorbachev has turned
again to provide the instrument of strengthened mass participation in
the governing process.
In response to the strike which led to severe fighting at street barri-
cades, not only in St. Petersburg but in Moscow, the Tsar's Prime
Minister, Count S.Y. Witte, drafted a revised plan. On the basis of
10. For a Western scholar's account of the history of the Communist Party, see L. SHAPIRO,
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (New York 1970).
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this plan the Tsar issued a Manifesto of October 30, 1905. In it he
promised civil liberties, a democratic franchise and legislative powers
for the Duma; but his concessions were not enough to quell the upris-
ing. Barricade fighting forced the issue. The Tsar again compro-
mised, offering on December 24, as the insurrection continued, to
include workmen in the franchise without limitation. Troops sup-
pressed the revolutionaries manning the barricades, but that did not
end pressure. The Tsar offered a further concession: on February 20,
1906 he proclaimed a "Basic Law" or Constitution.
Speranski's model was at last enacted: a parliament of two cham-
bers; one a reformed State Council and the other a Duma. The first
was composed of members, one half appointed by the Tsar and one
half elected by the nobility, the Zemstvos and the university faculties.
The Duma, in contrast, was to bring forward representatives from
each formally defined soslovie (class) in society, each voting separately.
The institutions of a limited democracy were now in place, but the
Tsar soon came to feel that the Duma's deputies were abusing their
newly created authority. On two occasions he prorogued the Duma
and ruled by decree, as permitted by a clause he had inserted in the
Constitution for such an eventuality. Then he revised the electoral law
to assure election of a body that might be expected to be less radical,
but he was disappointed in his expectation. World War I had broken
out. With heavy defeats of the Imperial Armies, even the new right-
wing Duma became restless and demanded reform. The Tsar re-
sponded by assuming personal command of the Army. In desperation,
his former supporters demanded his abdication in February 1917, and
received it. The Tsar, being reluctant to lose the monarchy, named his
brother successor, but the latter refused to ascend the throne unless
requested to do so by a constituent assembly. In refusing, the brother
initiated a debate among nobility and people as to what would be the
appropriate new form of government.
CHOOSING A MODEL FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT
Quite different ideas for a new form of government were being cir-
culated among the various forces seeking change. Political parties
came to the fore as spokesmen, one of the most vocal being a party
which had figured actively in the Duma after the introduction of elec-
tions under the Constitution of 1906. It espoused an English model of
constitutional democracy and was called popularly the "Kadet" party
because of this. Its hope was to establish limits on absolute power.
The written form had been popularized by the American model, with
[Vol. 10: 176
Models for a Gorbachev Constitution
no favoring of the British system in which restraints are created by
''conventions."
With the Tsar's abdication in March 1917 and his brother's refusal
to ascend the throne without a popular mandate from a constituent
assembly, the road was open for something of a replay of the Philadel-
phia Constitutional Convention. Still, the task of choosing and assem-
bling such a gathering was as difficult as it had been in America, if not
more difficult, for in Russia power was diffused throughout what had
been the Empire. The Zemstvos as local government were weak, and
ineffective as organizers. To meet the situation, the Duma formed a
"provisional government," but its members had to face immediately a
new force in opposition, namely the socialist parties. These worker
and peasant representatives had a model in mind which was neither
that of the English parliamentary system nor that of the American
presidential system. Many claimed to be Marxists, and the key idea
absorbed from their studies was that a State is an instrument of class
domination, not a benign impartial institution whose function is to
reconcile conflicting views.
To the Marxist specialists, the American Constitution was drafted
by a combination of wealthy landowners of the South and the industri-
alists of the North to protect their interests as owners of productive
property. Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence was seen
as an appeal for liberation from autocracy on the one hand, but also a
restatement of interests of the propertied classes. "1 It was not accepta-
ble as a model for the new Russia that the socialists wished to create.
The socialists were not united. Lenin faced strong opposition. He
controlled but one faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor
Party, and it was not even a majority faction, in spite of its name Bol-
shevik, which it had acquired in one vote at the London conference in
1903 and held on to ever after. This was proved during the summer of
1917, when delegates to what became known as a "First Congress of
Soviets" gathered. The moderate faction, dubbed Mensheviks, coupled
with the peasant-based Socialist Revolutionary Party members, consti-
tuted the majority. All groups wanted to be rid of the monarchy, but
except for this riddance their programs differed. Mensheviks, who felt
themselves cousins to the Social Democrats of Western Europe, em-
phasized the rights of the individual and favored non-ruthless proce-
11. See III VSEOBSHCHAIA ISTORIIA GUSODARSTVA I PRAVA, CHAST' (III GENERAL HIS-
TORY OF THE STATE AND LAW) 193 (Moscow 1947). See also M. TANIN, Introduction to chap-
ter on the constitution of the USA in I KONSTITUTSII BURZHUAZNYKH STRAN: VELIKIE
DERZHAVY I ZAPADNYE SOSEDI SSSR (1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE BOURGEOIS COUNTRIES:
THE GREAT POWERS AND WESTERN NEIGHBORS OF THE USSR) 7-18 (Moscow/Leningrad
1935).
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dures to achieve their goals. For the peasants, the major demands
were calls for distribution of the great estates, which they saw as nec-
essary to the achievement of "socialization." 1 2 The Mensheviks also
wanted a form of autonomy for local government, which they ex-
pected to control. By contrast, the Bolsheviks were nationalizers and
centralizers and willing to use whatever measures were required to
achieve their goals, no matter how ruthless. Still, none of the groups
wanted to leave untouched what they called, in Marxist verbiage, the
"bourgeoisie," a term which included owners of large scale productive
wealth, whether industrial or agricultural.
To press their cause against the Provisional Government estab-
lished by the Duma, the socialists of all colors formed in the early
spring of 1917 a competing political power built upon the model devel-
oped in 1905 as a strike committee and representing the worker and
peasant classes in society. To indicate continuity, the socialists called
their competing institution the Petrograd Soviet, and they encouraged
the formation of similar bodies throughout the cities of Russia and
even in some parts of the countryside.
The local soviets were structurally based upon "class," as defined
by Marxist theorists. Their purpose was to establish a power base for
like-minded workers and peasants. The soviets of 1905 had not been
governments, but rather instruments of opposition. Now, in 1917, the
socialists aspired to govern, and the road looked open due to the weak-
ness of the Provisional Government. The Petrograd Soviet which held
its meetings in the same place as the Duma felt cheeky enough to de-
clare that it was maintaining a system of "dual power," and it under-
took to urge public opposition to Duma policies which it disfavored.
Perhaps the Petrograd Soviet would have been no more than a nui-
sance to the Provisional Government had it not been for the defeat of
the Russian Army in July 1917 on the front maintained against the
Imperial German and Austro-Hungarian Armies. After that defeat
the spirit went out of the Army, and the Provisional Government lost
public support. The coup de grace is often said to have been shot when
the Army's Commanding General, Kornilov, turned against Prime
Minister Alexander Kerensky. Kerensky felt that he had to rely upon
the Soviet to protect himself from Kornilov's troops. From that mo-
ment, victory had been won, and it was necessary only to capture the
Palace and the Ministers on the night of November 7, 1917. In tradi-
tionally centralized Russia, when the capital fell, most of the country
had been captured.
12. See 0. RADKEY, THE AGRARIAN FOES OF BOLSHEVISM (New York/London 1958).
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The battle within the socialist coalition was not yet over, for the
Bolshevik extremists under Lenin's leadership were determined to take
the leadership position. Because of his dominant role in the seizure of
power, it was he who was able to walk on to the platform at the meet-
ing of what was called the "Second Congress of Soviets," called in
anticipation of the fall of the Winter Palace, to unite the socialists for
the purpose of forming a government. He succeeded in winning the
delegates so that they approved his projects, including a resolution to
form a new temporary soviet-type government, which he would chair.
The form was to be a coalition with his partners, the left Socialist Rev-
olutionaries and a left wing of the Menshevik faction. He also thought
it expedient to continue with the organization of the elections planned
by the now defeated Provisional Government. Consequently, he was
prepared to sponsor continuation of the elections being held at the
time throughout Russia to elect delegates to a constituent assembly to
choose a form for a permanent political system.1 3 To a degree, Lenin
was following the Philadelphia model. He sensed the desirability of
behaving like a partisan of constitutionalism; yet, when he feared that
a constituent assembly would reject his draft for a government of the
soviet type, he had his sailors bar the doors to the hall after the dinner
recess. His intent seems to have been to utilize the Assembly as a
rubber stamp of his policy rather than as a deliberative body devoted
to debate and reconciliation.
Perhaps on this score it can be said that the American concept of
constitutionalism as well as the French Declaration of Rights of Man
and Citizen of 1789 had an influence upon the socialists. All types of
Russian socialists evidenced at the time acceptance of the principle of
mass support for a choice of government forms through a constituent
assembly. No group held back from the concept of a written constitu-
tion. No one evidenced a wish to follow England's example of dis-
pensing with a written constitution to control excesses in government
through hoary tradition, which the British call "convention." Possi-
bly, socialists thought there was no time to create tradition. To im-
plant the radical concept of socialism in Russian society, speed was
needed, lest the opposition parties unite to prevent its realization.
In spite of the coup engineered by Lenin to disband the Constitu-
ent Assembly, some of the victorious socialists seem not to have real-
ized that the choice of government forms had been made irrevocably
13. For a dramatic account of revolutionary events, see J. REED, TEN DAYS THAT SHOOK
THE WORLD (Moscow 1967). For an account of the conduct of elections to the Constituent
Assembly, see 0. RADKEY, THE ELECTION TO THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF 1917
(Cambridge, Mass. 1950).
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on the night of the revolution. At the "Third Congress of Soviets,"
called soon after the doors of the Constituent Assembly had been
barred, a constitutional drafting committee was given a mandate to
draft a basic law to establish a new regime. Some of its members
demonstrated their lack of unanimity. Fortunately for historians, one
of their number wrote on the fifth anniversary of the Third Congress's
resolutions an account of the drafting committee's deliberations, and
he attached drafts submitted to the committee. 14
From this account it is known that the committee's members
presented a variety of proposals for consideration. The variety is said
to have been stimulated by the fact that the People's Commissariat of
Justice was headed by Lenin's coalition partner, a Socialist Revolu-
tionary. Later this equivalent of a Minister of Justice wrote his
memoirs to disclose his fear at the time that Lenin had no intention of
acting in accordance with principles of law and constitutional con-
straint upon absolute power. 15 Consequently, because he anticipated
Lenin's scheme, he had a draftsman of his Commissariat present a
moderate, though socialist-flavored draft. His draft was not the only
one in opposition, for one member even suggested that the Constitu-
tion of the Swiss Confederation should be considered as a model.
The various counter-proposals were put aside, however, after the
young Josef Stalin rose to demand that the committee draft a constitu-
tion which would put in written and permanent form what had al-
ready been created provisionally during the revolutionary events: the
soviet system whose institutions were a Congress of Soviets, a Central
Executive Committee, and a Council of People's Commissars. In Sta-
lin's view, as expressed by the historian, the Committee had only to
take over the resolutions adopted by the Third Congress of Soviets,
including the class-oriented Declaration of Rights of the Laboring and
Exploited People, and the federal plan for a Russian Republic, as well
as the administrative structures developed provisionally by the Second
Congress of Soviets on the historic occasion when power had been
seized.
Curiously, in view of the class approach to government espoused
by Marxists, a bill of rights was inserted in rather liberal form. The
need for the bill after adoption by the Third Congress of the Declara-
tion of Rights of Laboring and Exploited People was questioned by the
historian. He concluded that it was introduced for propaganda pur-
poses both at home and abroad. He explained that when the bill was
14. See G. GURVICH, ISORIIA SOVETSKOI KONSTITUTSII (HISTORY OF THE SOVIET CONSTI-
TUTION) (Moscow 1923).
15. See I. STEINBERG, IN THE WORKSHOP OF THE REVOLUTION 145-51 (New York 1953).
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brought into committee at almost the last moment, he thought it
Lenin's proposal, but he was not sure. He credited Lenin with a sense
of what was necessary to reduce his opposition. He supposed that the
article tolerating religion was required as a tactic, for Lenin was an
atheist, as was his Party. The historian concluded that the tactic had
been successful, as the faithful had been pacified.
Events of the subsequent years have born out the historian's sup-
position. The right extended to the faithful to propagate religion
through education was withdrawn, leaving only the right to conduct
the cult, while the right of citizens to conduct anti-religious education
was guaranteed. In view of the lack of opposition to the amendment it
may be supposed that the Church, the Mosque and the Synagogue no
longer were a threat to Communist politics, and so the propaganda
value of the original bill was no longer required. Many years later,
expediency rather than doctrine again seems to have provided the
stimulus to formulation of religious policy, for during the Second
World War, Stalin returned to the Church the right to educate priests,
presumably to gain support for the war not only at home but abroad.
Again in 1988, Gorbachev met with Patriarch Pimen, returning mon-
asteries and Churches to the Patriarch at the time of celebration of the
millennium of adoption of Christianity by Prince Vladimir.' 6 There
are some who thought this step was needed to gain support for per-
estroika and the new thinking.
On the face of it, the decisions to include a written bill of rights in
the Constitution, both in the United States and in Soviet Russia, may
appear to have been similarly motivated, but the two considerations
cannot be considered parallel. In the United States, the draftsmen had
thought it unnecessary to insert a written bill because the principles
were fully accepted as natural law. In Soviet Russia the communists,
as atheists, opposed freedom of religion and negated their inner con-
victions when they inserted the bill. The concession to political neces-
sity was easy in the United States, but difficult in Soviet Russia, for it
ran against the grain.
The communists in making their concession evidenced in their text
a fear that it might eventually return to haunt them. They inserted a
well known caveat in Article 23: "Being Guided by the interests of the
working class as a whole, the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Re-
public deprives all individuals of rights which could be utilized by
them to the detriment of the socialist revolution."' 17
16. For Gorbachev's speech to Patriarch Pimen, April 29, 1988, see Pravda, April 30, 1988,
at 1, translated in 50 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, May 25, 1988, at 6.
17. For an English translation of the 1918 Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic Con-
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In short, the Leninist socialists planned to rely upon courts and
administrators to decide in each case whether a citizen claiming pro-
tection of the Constitutional bill hoped to hamper the government in
achieving its goals. Since the coalition partners had withdrawn or
been ousted by July 1918 when the Constitution was adopted, this
structure left the Communist Party as the sole determiner of goals. Its
interpretations could not be challenged effectively.
THE NOVELTY OF THE MARXIST CLASS APPROACH
Because of this history, the first Russian Republic Constitution of
1918 and its federal (U.S.S.R.) successors of 1923, 1936, and 197718
have all been class-oriented documents. Those who drafted them and
the administrators and courts who have interpreted them have re-
jected the often-quoted statement of Oliver Wendell Holmes, made in
his dissent in Lochner v. United States: "[A] constitution is not in-
tended to embody a particular economic theory, whether paternalism
and the organic relation of the citizen or laissez-faire. It is made for
people of fundamentally different views."' 9
The class line of the 1918 Constitution was not left for develop-
ment solely by the administration and the courts. It was stated in
precise terms in the provision for election. Article 64 gave the right to
vote and to be elected to the assemblies to "all who have acquired the
means of livelihood through labor that is productive and useful to so-
ciety and to persons engaged in housekeeping which enables the for-
mer to do productive work, to soldiers of the soviets, and to citizens of
these two categories who have in any degree lost their capacity to
work."
Lest the provision be misinterpreted, a following Article 65 denied
the right to vote or be elected to:
persons who have income without doing work, such as from interest on
capital, receipts from property, etc.; to private merchants and commer-
cial brokers; to monks and clergy of all denominations; to agents and
employees of the former police; to the gendarme corps; to the Tsar's
secret service, and also to members of the former reigning dynasty; to
persons declared in any legal way demented or mentally deficient; to per-
sons under guardianship; to persons who have been deprived by a soviet
stitution, see A. UNGER, supra note 3; or CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY STATES
2-16 (J. Triska, ed., Stanford 1968).
18. A convenient source of the U.S.S.R. Constitutions of 1936 and 1977 together with com-
mentary, likely to be in every law library, is A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. 1971).
19. 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
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of their rights of citizenship because of selfish or dishonorable offenses
for the period fixed by the sentence.
To be sure, the draftsmen in Philadelphia were also selective in
defining those with the right to vote, excluding slaves, women, and the
propertyless. Jefferson is said to have expected such prosperity after
independence that all male citizens would come to own property and
thus qualify to vote, but until that time he and his colleagues were not
confident that the propertyless could be expected to support the repub-
lic in which they had no property stake. Later, of course, all of these
restraints were removed through Constitutional amendment or judi-
cial interpretation.
The 1918 limitations were also removed when the second federal
Constitution was adopted in 1936, but removal was under different
circumstances. In the United States the restraints were lifted on wo-
men and those who could not afford to pay the poll tax because these
groups gained political strength. In the U.S.S.R., the great bulk of
those excluded had been reduced in number as state enterprises and
collective farming absorbed the former private enterprisers into what
was defined as the working class. Except for priests and the former
police, the lifting of the restraints enfranchised no one. The former
bourgeoisie who lived on returns from capital no longer existed as
bourgeoisie in Marxist terms, because the 1936 Constitution forbade
the private employment for personal gain of even one person and be-
cause merchandising had been declared criminal in 1932, thus abolish-
ing legal traders. Even the priests, mullahs and rabbis who were still
ministering to their flocks had been so greatly reduced in number by
the application of repressive policies that Stalin himself found it possi-
ble to tell his Constitutional convention of 1936 that they could no
longer be seen as a dangerous political force. 20
The Marxist-inspired class bias of the 1918 Constitution had led
also to the inclusion within its provisions of a clause totally foreign to
anything in the American Constitution. This was the provision antici-
pating the eventual "withering away of the state." Article 9 restated
the class orientation in these words: "The fundamental problem of the
Constitution ... involves, in view of the present transition period, the
establishment of a dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and
the poorest peasantry in the form of an all powerful soviet authority."
It then added these remarkable words: "in which there will be neither
a division into classes nor state authority." This phrase is to be ex-
20. See J. STALIN, On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R., in LENINISM 179, 403 (Interna-
tional Publishers, New York 1942). Since this work is in various editions, the relevant portion
may be found in any one of them as Part V, para. 13.
Winter 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
plained by the conclusion of Marx and Engels that, since State author-
ity was an instrument of compulsion created and used by a governing
class to repress those classes hostile to it, the state must fade away
when the entire population consists of only one class, the working
class. There would be no further need for class suppression. 21
In 1918, when Lenin's draftsmen were at work, some Communists
expected the withering to begin rather promptly after the ownership of
private property was denied to individuals. Consequently, they ex-
pected the State authority established by the new Constitution to be
only of a temporary nature. Production was to be bountiful to meet
all needs for compulsion on a mass basis. Deviant individuals would
be few and they would be treated by medical doctors. At this point,
as Engels described it, there would remain only the "administration of
things."
Although the withering theme may seem totally visionary to most
Americans, its reality in Soviet minds at the time is evidenced by
draftsmen in the mid- 1920s who prepared codes of law to reflect what
they expected to be the first stages of withering. 22 Only in 1930 did
Stalin utter a brief sentence in a long report on other matters telling
his party colleagues that the State would wither, to be sure, but not
until it had become the strongest State the world had ever known. 23
This put an end to the constitutional statements of anticipated wither-
ing, and they are not to be found in later constitutions.
American draftsmen in 1787 labored under no such conception of
the State as an instrument of a ruling class, dominating the rest of
society. The State was seen not as an oppressor of classes but as a
mediator of conflict, a force above special interests. Its task was to
insure domestic tranquility, not class struggle. That seems to be the
sense of the words in the preamble, saying the purpose was to "secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." It was to be an
instrument of a populace, mature enough politically to vote rationally
in the interests of all. It would not wither away; it would be eternal.
In contrast to Mr. Justice Holmes's view of the Constitution as
21. For a development of the theme of "withering away of the State," see F. ENGELS, THE
ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY 236 (International Publishers, New York 1972). For Lenin's interpreta-
tion of the concept, see V. LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION (Cooperative Publishing Society of
Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow 1935). Both works are in numerous editions.
22. The drafts were prepared by E.B. Pashukanis. For analysis of his reasoning, see
PASHUKANIS (P. Bierne & R. Sharlet, eds., London/New York/San Francisco 1980). For rele-
vant portions of the simplified draft codes, see Hazard, The Abortive Codes of the Pashukanis
School in 19 CODIFICATION OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD 145-75 (F. Feldbrugge, ed., Leyden
1975).
23. Stalin, Political Report of the Central (Party) Committee to the XVI Congress, 1930, in 5
20TH CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 235 (H. Babb trans., Cambridge 1951).
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non-programmatic, Soviet constitutions have always stated a social
program; they have been demonstrably programmatic. This being so,
they have been displaced as programs change to make way for an en-
tirely new constitution. Here it may be said that the French rather
than the American influence has been felt. Just as the French have
moved over nearly two centuries through various Constitutions to
reach their Fifth Republic, so also Soviet society has been guided into
new eras by a succession of Constitutions. Secretary General
Gorbachev acted in this tradition in 1988 when he indicated that a
revised document with a different state structure was needed to lead
contemporary society into an era suited to conditions of the 21st
Century.
Goals have been set forth in long preambles to Soviet constitutions
with one exception, that of 1936. Stalin explained that omission: It
was unnecessary to do more than mark the beginning of a new era,
that of socialism, for which the Constitution was designed. His suc-
cessors reverted to Lenin's model. By 1961 Nikita Khrushchev as Sec-
retary General of the Communist Party engineered the drafting of a
new Party Program to replace the Program of 1919, which had long
been out of date, saying as it did, for example, that communists antici-
pated the eventual abolition of money, and that the State was a dicta-
torship of the proletariat. Khrushchev cut out the money plank, and
devised a new formula for the State: it was to be an "instrument of the
entire people." Some Communists outside the U.S.S.R. - notably
Mao Tse-tung - gasped in disbelief, and many inside the U.S.S.R.
mumbled under their breath that it was non-Marxist. Because it was
of such importance as a novel formula it bears repeating:
Proletarian democracy is becoming more and more a socialist democracy
of the people as a whole .... The dictatorship of the proletariat has
fulfilled its historical mission and has ceased to be indispensable to the
U.S.S.R. from the point of view of internal development. The State
which arose as a State of the dictatorship of the proletariat has become
in the new contemporary period a State of the entire people, an organ
expressing the interests and will of the people as a whole.24
The conclusion was not illogical, granting the premise that to
Marxists, there was at the time but one class in Soviet society, and,
therefore, no hostile class to be suppressed. What was illogical in
terms of the old formula of "withering" on achievement of a classless
society was that the state obviously continued to exist as an instrument
of compulsion even after the constitutional declaration of 1936 that
24. For texts comparing the 1919 and 1961 Communist Party Programs, see generally So-
VIET COMMUNISM: PROGRAMS AND RULES (J. Triska ed., San Francisco 1962).
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socialism had been achieved. To explain the ideological reason for the
change something had to be said, and it was. Ideologists developed
the explanation that the State was necessary to resist invasion by hos-
tile class forces abroad and also to coordinate the work of various
strata of Soviet society, which, although within a single working class,
still evidenced distinctive interests which would take time to reconcile.
They would be reconciled peacefully because they were not antagonis-
tic, but no one denied that there were sufficient frictions to require
reconciliation.
Some years were needed to absorb the words of the Communist
Party's formula into constitutional law, with the result that
Khrushchev had been ousted before transformation occurred. It fell
to his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, to set draftsmen to work on a new
federal Constitution. When it was promulgated in 1977, its Article 1
read, "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of all
the people."
With this formula, interpreted as it had been by the Communist
Party with changing events, the distinction between American and So-
viet Constitutionalism was epitomized: the draftsmen at Philadelphia
sensed that they were writing for people of all classes and all faiths; the
draftsmen in Moscow wrote for a people purged by 1977 of all ele-
ments having origins outside a working class milieu.
THE NOVELTY OF STATE STRUCTURE
State structures in the U.S.S.R., as defined in successive constitu-
tions, bear little resemblance to those in the American model. Of
course, there are some resemblances for functional reasons: both sys-
tems of government face some identical problems, as both are federa-
tions; both were formed as federations to assure military and economic
survival; both sought at the outset to induce people to join in federa-
tion voluntarily because such a structure could demonstrably benefit
the participating units - although in the Soviet case there were far
stronger forces influencing union than had been the case in the infant
United States. In the United States there was no force comparable to
the Communist Party working for union.
Lenin's Communist Party was indeed sui generis as a highly disci-
plined, unitary militant nucleus with monopoly power. Perhaps it
needed to be what it was if there were to be federation. Although
there was enough hostility between the states of the American federa-
tion at the outset to suggest the need for inferior federal courts to pro-
vide a forum to hear disputes between citizens of different states, there
was certainly no such historic hostility over centuries as that between
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the Moslems of Central Asia and the Orthodox Christians of Russia,
the once independent Ukrainians and Baltic peoples. To be sure the
war between the states in the United States was bitter, but after the
peace the conflict did not fester as it has festered between Armenians
and Azerbaijanis. Lenin had his problems of reconciling historic con-
flict between peoples who had been made even angrier by long years of
attempted Russification by the Tsars. Federation was his formula for
reconciliation, but it was not his long term plan.
For Lenin, the ideal was Marx's concept of class affinity rather
than ethnic affinity. He expected as his basis for ultimate reconcilia-
tion that hostile ethnic groups would eventually forget their ethnicity
and share together as workers in a class affinity which would over-
come all obstacles to union. He had constructed his Communist Party
without ethnic divisions. It was one working class organization, even
though some ethnic groups tried in the early days to create it along
federal lines. But the State structure could be built on a compromise,
in Lenin's view, and the extreme manifestation of that compromise
was provision for the secession of members of the federation if they so
desired. He was not happy with the idea, and he had Stalin write that
the Communist Party would not support such a demand, for to secede
would be to take a step away from ultimate class union. 25 Thus he
maintained his ideal as a goal, but he accepted the need for
compromise.
Unity in Lenin's federation was encouraged by more than a doctri-
nal ideal. From the early 1920s he structured the economy in a more
centralized manner than had been possible in the United States. While
the Philadelphia Congress thought primarily in economic terms of
maintaining the unity of interstate commerce while leaving the states
free to acquire their own finances and to manage their own resources,
the Soviet pattern was complete subjection to a central economic plan.
No right of local taxation was left to the Republics, for taxes were to
be levied by the central government and the resulting resources were
distributed under the plan by the central parliament through the me-
dium of the state budget.
Economic independence of federating units such as is fostered in
the American federal system was hampered by yet another provision,
albeit indirectly. This provision, written into the Constitution of 1936
25. Stalin wrote on three occasions against secession. His argument was that the right must
not be exercised if the result would be contrary to the interests of the proletarian revolution. The
1913 pamphlet and the 1917 report to the 7th All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP have been
reprinted in J. STALIN, MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTION 19, 64 (Mos-
cow 1935). He uttered the same thought in an article in the newspaper Pravda of Oct. 10, 1920.
See 4 J. STALIN, WORKS, NOVEMBER 1917-1920, 364-66 (1947).
Winter 19891
Michigan Journal of International Law
and into subsequent constitutions, prohibits private ownership of pro-
ducer's goods, except those utilized by licensed artisans working with-
out employees. No capitalists were to be left in society to press for
adoption of a laissez-faire policy. The central agencies had, in conse-
quence of this economic fact, not only the legal strings attached by the
Constitution to the agencies functioning at local levels, but also the
economic strings available as a result of total State ownership of pro-
ductive resources. There could be no economic pluralism which might
have become the source of political pluralism.
Some governmental structures to implement powers conferred
upon the central government were similar to both federations. Thus
military policy and the levying of troops were federal concerns. 26 So
also were the services needed to provide uniformity in coinage, the
post office, and standardization of weights and measures. While these
functions were centralized in both systems, there was a contrast in
Constitutional attitudes toward local government structures. The
American model leaves each state to choose its own governmental
structure except to require that they be republican in form. The Soviet
model allows for no such local autonomy. The structures of not only
Republic government but also of local subdivisions must conform to
the model developed historically as the Soviet. This means each unit
has an assembly, an executive committee and various administrative
departments established in accordance with the types of activities car-
ried out by the unit. The federal constitution even indicates that the
assembly must meet at given intervals. Some Sovietologists have
thought that the major characteristic of Soviet law is "paternalism," 27
and indeed much can be presented in support of such a conclusion.
Although each Soviet at levels below that of federation is author-
ized to take decisions on matters of local concern, the action must
conform to that established as the national pattern and plan. The
budget must fit within the global limits set by the national budget for
each Republic. In turn, the subdivision of budgets must fit within the
Republic totals in amounts established by the Republic soviet. What is
not said, but what all know, is that Communist Party members at the
local government level "guide" the state agencies at that level in im-
26. In 1944, Stalin amended the Constitution to authorize Republics to create military for-
mations, albeit under the centralized policy established by the federal government. The move
occurred at the time Stalin was seeking to multiply votes in the General Assembly of the United
Nations, which was being formed for post-war coordination among the nations of the world.
When he was rebuffed in this effort by Roosevelt and Churchill, who would permit only the
Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics to have seats in the United Nations, the military forma-
tions of the Republic lapsed.
27. This has been the long-held view of H.J. Berman. See H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE
U.S.S.R. REVISED AND ENLARGED 278-384 (New York 1963).
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plementation of the constitutional provision that the Communist
Party is the Guiding force in Soviet politics. 28 The word "guide" has
come to mean a much more commanding directive, although the pre-
cise translation of the Russian word rukovodit suggests the milder
form.
29
The attitude of hostility toward laissez-faire and diversity of poli-
cies has been carried into the Soviet method of drafting codes of law.
Ever since federation, except for some years under the 1936 Constitu-
tion when codes of law were to be federal, a provision never imple-
mented because of the disruption of government during World War II,
the Republics have been authorized to establish their own codes of
law. Nevertheless, they have been required, in so doing, to comply
with the "Fundamental Principles" enacted by the federal Supreme
Soviet as guides. 30 While much is made by Soviet jurists of the flexibil-
ity offered to the Republics to depart from the federal model to meet
social, climatic, and other distinctive conditions of the peoples of the
Republics, practice has demonstrated that these departures from the
norm have been minimally important.
While most of the distinctive features of the Soviet governmental
system are not compared by Soviet authors with their American coun-
terparts, there is one comparison that has been belabored. It is the
principle of "separation of powers." Soviet authors have heaped scorn
upon it, describing it as a system which has been used to strengthen
the hand of the capitalist class against any possible influences the
working class might bring to bear upon the legislature.
Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Stalin's principal spokesman on legal philos-
ophy in the late 1930s, writing in what was then the standard text on
Soviet State Law, 31 summed up an attitude which remains dominant
even today:
But why did the bourgeoisie need to preserve in form in the constitutions
the principle of separation of powers? For the same reason that obtained
as to the formality of principles of bourgeois democracy: the principles
of the separation of powers were to implant in the popular masses illu-
sions as to the "justice" of power, the impossibility of "arbitrary" pow-
ers, the "legal state" in which no single power can by its arbitrariness
solve the most important questions: that powers are supposedly "equal-
ized" and control each other. The principle of separation of powers was
28. See KONST. SSSR, ch. 1, art. 6, cl.l (U.S.S.R. 1977).
29. For an historical account and analysis of the Communist Party practice as "guide," see
generally W. CONYNGHAM, INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION (Stanford
1973).
30. For a Soviet translation into English, see THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM (W. Butler trans.,
New York 1978).
31. See A. VYSHINSKY, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 314 (1948).
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to strengthen the idea of bourgeois power as power elevated above
classes - "popular sovereignty," supposed to distribute the functions of
legislation and administration reasonably and impartially among diverse
state organs.
The American will see at a glance what a contrast in attitudes toward
the support for checks and balances under the United States Constitu-
tion is presented by Vyshinsky. The Soviet state is structured in ac-
cordance with the principles enunciated by Jean Jacques Rousseau:
the legislature alone reflects the "general will" and nothing can be per-
mitted to thwart that will. Vyshinsky's approach is not, of course, his
invention. There is a model in the United Kingdom, where parliament
is the supreme all-powerful authority, unchecked by any other
"branch" of government. Indeed, the American colonists were seek-
ing protection against just such an all-powerful authority when they
devised the American system.
Of course, the parliament is not alone in the U.S.S.R. There is an
executive and a judiciary at both federal and Republic levels. Soviet
draftsmen did not revert to feudal times where the ruler performed all
functions himself. Western models, indeed in a measure Tsarist mod-
els, were copied out with a slight difference. There is an executive in
the form of a Council of Ministers, and there is a judiciary in hierar-
chical form.
The Council of Ministers is chaired by a Prime Minister who for-
mally presents to each newly elected Supreme Soviet his proposal for a
cabinet. The judiciary is headed by the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.
with one set of inferior federal courts for military personnel that also
has jurisdiction over espionage regardless of the status of the spy,
whether military or civilian, whether Soviet citizen or foreigner. The
major litigation, as in the Federal Republic of Germany, is conducted
in the courts of the republics, from which matters may be presented to
the federal Supreme Court through a procedure comparable in some
measure to certiorari in the United States. Matters may be presented
on "protest" by the Procurator General of the U.S.S.R., or on motion
of the President of the Supreme Court. Neither the judiciary nor the
executive has the right to review acts of the legislature. There are no
checks and balances. Soviet jurists describe their system as one incor-
porating a system of "separation of functions" but not a "separation of
powers."
A further departure from the American model was in the person of
the head of state. Lenin rejected the Presidential system in favor of
what he thought preferable as a representative of the community,
namely a collective presidency. In a sense, the interim small legislative
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authority chosen by the Supreme Soviet to act between sessions, called
the "Presidium," is the collective head of state. But for the sake of
convenience the chair of the body receives and sends Ambassadors,
performs ceremonial functions, and signs with its secretary its norma-
tive acts.
GORBACHEV'S REFORM OF STRUCTURES
The gasps at the 19th Communist Party Conference may be under-
stood when Gorbachev's proposals are compared with what had come
to be accepted as an enduring Soviet model to be utilized for a long
period of time. The revision of the Constitution in 1977 had been her-
alded as meeting the needs of mature socialism for the foreseeable fu-
ture. Soviet society seemed to have settled into a permanent political
and economic framework. Gorbachev now says the society had be-
come so satisfied that it had entered into an era of "stagnation." His
proposals were to revive the dynamism of earlier years, and he meant
to include restructuring of the state system through such extensive
amendment of the 1977 Constitution as to suggest that it might be
called a new one.
The first blow in restructuring fell upon the existing legislature, the
Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev's proposal seemed to have drawn on
Lenin's model created by the 1923 Constitution. There was to be re-
instituted a Congress of Soviets, now to be called a Congress of Work-
ing People's Deputies. From its members there would be selected rep-
resentatives to sit in a full-time bicameral Supreme Soviet of smaller
size than previously. It seemed to be patterned on what Lenin had
called a bicameral Central Executive Committee of the Congress of
Soviets. The principal legislative function would be in this body, as
the Congress would meet only annually for a few days. With its pro-
posed 1500 deputies it could not be expected to concern itself with
detail, but only with general policy presented by the Communist
Party's Secretary General in a new capacity. The Secretary General
would, under the plan, become an official of the State, sitting as Presi-
dent of a new parliament. He was to be given enhanced powers to
exceed the current ceremonial ones granted to the Chair of the
Supreme Soviet's Presidium. In a measure his power was to resemble
that of Western presidents who introduce drafts for discussion, but
still his role would be different. This is because he would not be
elected independently of the legislative authority, as in France and the
United States, but by the Congress of the Working People's Deputies.
His post cannot be interpreted as consistent with the separation of
powers.
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Symbolically, the model to be introduced reverted to a structure
mindful of Lenin's 1923 Constitution. At that time the supreme pol-
icy making state body was a Congress of great size symbolizing the
united working class, whatever its various ethnic origins. Although
ethnic entities were given representation in a subordinate bicameral
body designed to incorporate precision into the Congress's legislation,
their position was subordinate to that of the single class. In a sense,
ethnic entities such as the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Transcauca-
sians, were being given a window on policy formulation; but they were
not to be allowed to forget that the political system was the instrument
of a class and not of the ethnics.
As in 1923, delegates to the new Congress would not be elected
directly by citizens. One half would be chosen by social bodies, pri-
marily trade unions, the writers' union and organizations representing
occupational groups. In some western societies such a system is called
a manifestation of "corporatism." The other half would be chosen by
geographically-defined election districts through a process of selection
by soviet assemblies in provinces and ethnically defined Republics.
This structure suggested a return to the indirect elections of 1923 prior
to the revision of electoral rules in the 1936 Constitution.
While reversion to Lenin's structure might seem to have reempha-
sized the centralization which Gorbachev and his colleagues blamed
for "stagnation" in the past, the Politburo of the Party continued to
denounce centralization. It had been placing emphasis upon stimulat-
ing local government initiative. The apparatus of the Central Plan-
ning Committee, Gosplan, had already been reduced in size so*that it
was incapable of directing the producing Ministries in any detailed
way. Further, Ministries had been limited in their authority by a 1987
State Enterprise Law, which placed responsibility on the enterprise to
conduct activities without subsidization from the center, and without
directives from the planners as to what relationships they must main-
tain among themselves to achieve production. Only a general indica-
tion of a plan would be given as a guide to enterprise directors, who
were ordered to enter what was called a "socialist market" to seek out
other enterprises as partners with which contracts of supply would be
negotiated.
Constitutionalism would be brought to the fore, not by establishing
judicial review on the American model, but by creating a Constitu-
tional Committee patterned somewhat after the French model. It had
been suggested in pre-Conference communications to the press that
the Committee's primary purpose would be to review the Ministerial
orders, but it might also have been expected to receive authority to
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advise the Congress and Supreme Soviet of legislation contrary to the
Constitution. It was not proposed to permit the Committee to declare
legislation unconstitutional. The Committee would only signal the
possibility, and the supreme legislative authority would then decide
whether a constitutional amendment was desirable in light of the ad-
vice of legal specialists.
The Draftsmen Implement the Program for Reform
Immediately after the end of the 19th Communist Party Confer-
ence, Gorbachev set his draftsmen to work on the implementation of
his announced program of reform. The result was a draft of proposed
amendments to the Constitution, which was published in all Soviet
newspapers on October 22, 1988. In general, the draft conformed to
the program, but there were modifications.
For example, the proposed Congress of People's Deputies would
be enlarged to 2,250 deputies from the originally-proposed 1,500. Its
balance in representation of different forces was changed. Instead of
dividing the deputies into halves, one representing territorially defined
groups and the other what might be called in Western parlance "cor-
porate groups," the deputies would be chosen from three sources: (1)
750 from territorially defined groups of equal numbers of electors; (2)
750 from the various existing ethnically defined regions, to be repre-
sented in accordance with the following norms - 32 deputies from
each Union Republic, 11 from each Autonomous Republic, 5 from
each Autonomous Province and one from each Autonomous District;
(3) 750 deputies from public organizations in accordance with the fol-
lowing norms - 100 deputies from each of the following (a) the Com-
munist Party, (b) the Trade Unions, and (c) the Cooperatives; (4) 75
deputies each from (a) the Young Communist League, (b) the Associa-
tion of Women, (c) the Association of War and Labor Veterans, (d)
the Association of Scientific Workers, and (e) the Unions of Writers
and Artists; and (5) 75 deputies from a group comprising such other
public organizations and citizens' associations as might be formed in
accordance with law.
Choice of deputies within the various groups would not be uni-
form. Within the territorially and ethnically defined districts, citizens
were to vote directly for individuals, and the draft recommended that
the former practice of reducing the ballot to one candidate be aban-
doned in favor of multicandidate ballots. The professional or "corpo-
rate groups" were to choose their deputies either through vote of
general meetings of members or through their executive bodies. Can-
didates for election had to have reached 21 years of age, but voters, as
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in the past, needed to be only 18 years of age. Ballots were to be
secret, as in the past.
The unicameral Supreme Soviets of the various Unions and Auton-
omous Republics were also to be structured differently from the pres-
ent system of election - only from territorially defined districts of
equal population. Under the amendments, the unicameral Supreme
Soviets of Republics would consist of two groups of deputies: those
elected from territorially defined districts, and those sent forward by
the "corporate groups." The first group would constitute two thirds
of the deputies and the second the balance. A new rule was to exclude
from candidacy executives (Ministers in Republics and Executive
Committee members in lower soviets) except for the chairs of such ex-
ecutive bodies. Also to be excluded were judges, procurators and state
arbitrators functioning in the soviet's territory.
Nominations, as under the 1977 Constitution, might be presented
to electoral committees in each electoral district by any of a variety of
organizations: general assemblies of staff in state enterprises and of-
fices, public organizations, and citizens' meetings held in residential
areas, as well as by the military in their formations. The district elec-
toral committee, as at present, was to hear arguments in favor of can-
didates and select from among the nominees those who impressed the
committee as qualified.
The Congress was to sit only once a year to perform its policy-
making function of amending the Constitution; choosing the members
of the federation, and the lesser ethnic groups to be given distinctive
status as autonomous provinces or districts; establishing U.S.S.R. and
Republic boundaries; approving economic plans and cultural pro-
grams; electing the Supreme Soviet and its president and deputy presi-
dent; approving other prominent federal officials (the chair of the
Council of Ministers, the head of the People's Control system, the
Chief Justice, the Chief State Arbitrator and the Procurator General);
naming members of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision; re-
voking legislation at the federal or Republic level deemed to have been
unconstitutional; and determining the need for national referenda. A
majority vote of the members of the 2,250-member Congress was to be
required for action.
As expected, the plan, established by the Party Conference to place
authority to enact legislation within the policy established by the Con-
gress in a bicameral Supreme Soviet, was introduced as set in the Oc-
tober draft of amendments. Its members would no longer be elected
directly by citizens, but would be chosen by the Congress from its own
ranks. A formula was set for the selection of Supreme Soviet mem-
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bers: those in the Council of the Union were to be selected from Con-
gress deputies residing in territorially defined districts or being
members of "corporate groups" functioning in those districts. Those
in the Council of Nationalities were to be selected from ethnically de-
fined districts or from members of "corporate groups" who work or
reside in such districts. They varied in number: 7 for each Union
Republic, 4 for each Autonomous Republic, 2 for each Autonomous
Province and one from each Autonomous District. A rotation sched-
ule was provided: one fifth of the members of the two chambers had
to be renewed annually during each five-year term. The chambers
were to meet separately or jointly in Fall and Spring sittings of three to
four months.
As in the past, the two chambers were to elect members of a single
Presidium from among their members. This body was given the famil-
iar right to interpret laws and to issue provisional decrees, which were
to be enforced immediately, but which had to be submitted to the
Supreme Soviet at its next meeting for ratification. In the past, since
Supreme Soviet sittings lasted never more than a week on each of two
occasions a year, the Presidium, in effect, became the legislator.
Under the new arrangement, since the Supreme Soviet was to be in
session from six to eight months each year, the Presidium would pre-
sumably have less occasion to act provisionally during the recesses of
the Supreme Soviet.
The proposed new Presidency to replace the collective Presidency
of the 1977 Constitution has, since Gorbachev proposed it at the 19th
Communist Party Conference, attracted attention both within the
U.S.S.R. and abroad. As in the past, ceremonial functions, plus the
receiving of Ambassadors and the signing of treaties would be the task
of the President, who would now act on his personal authority rather
than simply as the chair of the collective presidency. The proposed
amendment did not create a system of separation of powers, for the
President was not to be elected by the public generally, but by the
Congress of People's Deputies, thus being made significantly
subordinate to the legislature which was to have the right to recall
him. His term was five years and might not be extended for more than
a second term. Although it was provided that he must sign laws en-
acted by the legislature, he was given no veto power; and since he
might be recalled by the legislature, his willingness to refuse to sign a
legislative act would seem to have been distinctly limited, even though
he might courageously, in view of his status within the Communist
Party, urge his colleagues in the legislature to withdraw their draft.
His duties were to include presentation of annual reports on the
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state of the nation and other issues which he might choose to explore,
and extended to presenting to the Supreme Soviet for election candi-
dates for the posts of chair of the Council of Ministers and of the
People's Control organization, as well as for the position of Chief Jus-
tice, Procurator General, and Chief State Arbitrator. He was to pre-
side over the Defense Council and negotiate international treaties. He
might issue neither laws nor decrees, but only directives which might
be countermanded by the Congress or the Supreme Soviet, to both of
which he was to be responsible.
The proposed new "Committee on Constitutional Supervision" has
also attracted attention, since the concept of "unconstitutionality" to
be found in the constitutional law of some other political systems has
always - up to the 19th Communist Party Conference - been de-
nounced as unsuited to the U.S.S.R. By the proposed amendments,
members of the Committee, which would number thirteen in addition
to a President and Vice President, and would be chosen for ten-year
terms by the Congress from specialists in politics and law, might not
be a member of a body whose acts were being reviewed for constitu-
tionality. The model of the United States Supreme Court has not been
copied, for the Committee was to be given no right to declare a law
enacted by the Congress of the Supreme Soviet unconstitutional. Its
role was to be advisory in that it might inform the enacting body that
it had concluded that the proposed law or enacted legislation was un-
constitutional. The enacting body then was expected to decide
whether to revise the law or draft or to pursue the matter further,
perhaps to the level of a constitutional amendment. The advisory
opinion might be submitted by the Committee on its own initiative or
at the request of the Congress or the Supreme Soviet. Should the mat-
ter proceed to constitutional amendment, a two-thirds vote of the en-
tire membership of the Congress of People's Deputies was to be
required. So long as the Communist Party retained the persuasive au-
thority that it has enjoyed throughout Soviet history; the defeat of
measures sponsored by it was likely to be rare.
Legislative acts of Union Republics and acts of their executive or-
gans were to enjoy less sanctity. If the Committee thought such acts
unconstitutional, it was to inform the issuing authority of that fact.
The offensive act was to be suspended until revoked by the issuing
authority, and if revocation did not follow, the Committee might turn
to the Congress of People's Deputies or the Supreme Soviet for final
determination of the issue.
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REACTIONS TO THE DRAFT AMENDMENTS
Journalists reported after publication of the draft amendments that
Soviet intellectuals were disappointed with it.32 In spite of the innova-
tions such as multi-candidate, although not multi-party, elections to
the Soviets at all levels, the institution of a Committee on Constitu-
tional Supervision, and lengthened terms of judges, intellectuals were
reported to fear that less potential for public influence upon policy
formulation was offered than under the 1977 Constitution. Indirect
election of the Supreme Soviet deputies seemed to insulate them from
direct influence by the public. To be sure, the single candidate elec-
tions of the past offered little opportunity to prevent the seating of an
undesirable person, but the potential existed; while under the proposed
amendment requiring that elections to the Supreme Soviet be con-
ducted within the Congress of People's Deputies from its own very
large assemblage, there seemed to be less potential for public influence.
Further, the large size of the Congress suggested that its decisions
would necessarily be guided by its leadership.
Further, the new Presidency, although clearly limited in power by
the Congress's right of recall, could be expected to provide strong in-
fluence on policy-making since it could propose legislation. The obvi-
ous advantage of this initiative seemed to be enhanced under present
conditions as the holder of the presidency would be simultaneously
Secretary General of the Communist Party. In this Party capacity, the
president could rely upon firmly established Party discipline to assure
support from Party members among Congress and Supreme Soviet
members to convince the deputies that his proposals had merit.
It is this latter feature of the draft that seems to have stimulated
fear in Andrei Sakharov, who is reported to have said that Gorbachev
can be expecting to proceed with his campaign to bring the masses
into policy making, but his successors may not be of the same mind.
THE CONSTITUTION IS AMENDED
The anticipated amendments to the 1977 Constitution were
adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at an extraordinary
session on December 1, 1988. 33 By vote of 1,344 deputies for, 5
against, and 27 abstentions, a proposal of a revision committee was
accepted. The vote itself was notable, as not since its creation in 1936
until 1988 had there ever been a vote which was not unanimous in the
32. Sakharov Warns of Perils in New Soviet Setup, New York Times, Nov. 2, 1988, at 1, col.
4.
33. The amendments are published in Izvestia, Dec. 3, 1988.
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Supreme Soviet. The opposition testified to the unrest in some of the
minority Republics, whose citizens seem to sense a great Russian de-
sire to dominate the federation. During the discussion of the draft of
October 22, it had become evident that the 1977 Constitution had
come to represent a potential, if not a reality, of minority Republic
influence upon the formation of policy. Demands were expressed for
consultation on policy formation and for direct election of representa-
tives to the new Supreme Soviet of deputies owing primary loyalty to
constituencies in the Republics.
The extraordinary session was told that a revision committee had
surveyed comments on the October draft and had attempted to re-
spond to concerns. Although no structural changes from those pro-
posed in the October draft were to be made, the revision committee's
spokesman declared that "clarifications" were offered in the new sub-
mission in order to assure the Republics that their voices would be
heard.
In evident assurance of this consideration, the re-draft submitted
incorporated several changes in provisions relating to the structure
and authority of the new Committee on Constitutional Control. Arti-
cle 125 provides that it would be increased in size to 23 members to
accommodate at least one judge from each of the fifteen Union Repub-
lics. By Article 120, Republics were authorized to appeal to the Com-
mittee for a ruling on the constitutional conformity of federal
departmental acts. By Article 114, the Committee was included for
the first time among the state agencies authorized to initiate legislation
in the Congress of Deputies, thus gaining greater power to insist that
its otherwise "advisory" opinions be adopted. Under Articles 119-
125, no doubt was left in the revised draft that the Committee's advice
alone could not set aside a law of the Republic of Supreme Soviets, for
the list of competences granted to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
was augmented to state that the Presidium's tasks included assurance
that Republic law conform to the federal constitution.
One of the major fears of Republics was countered by a new provi-
sion in Article 119 that no declaration of a state of emergency (martial
law) would be permitted by the federal authorities with regard to one
of the Republics without consultation with the Presidium of the Re-
public concerned. To satisfy the Latvian Republic, a provision was
inserted in Article 111 of the revised draft to the effect that in the
Supreme Soviet's chamber representing citizens by population, the de-
termination of electoral districts must take into consideration the
number of electors (and, presumably, not persons) within the district.
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Article 111 also provides that deputies representing Union Republics
were increased from 7 to 11 in the chamber of nationalities.
Estonia's request to be permitted to depart from the standard
model of Congress of Working People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet
set for each Republic was denied. Its delegates wanted to omit the
Congress, but the revision committee reported that there must be uni-
formity of structures in all Republics. Estonians were told that to
meet their desires, they might in their Constitution establish whatever
competence they might wish for their Congress, presumably to the
point of limiting it to ceremonial functions.
Republics' influence may have been increased by insertion in Arti-
cle 91 of the revised draft of a new provision that "most important
questions of federal and local concern" might be decided not only by
the federal Congress of Working People's Deputies and the Supreme
Soviet, but by vote in a national referendum.
A considerable number of changes in the wording of articles, os-
tensibly to clarify meaning, was made, and one major change in the
level of legal source was included: the specific designation of deputies
to represent each of the social organizations in the Congress of Peo-
ple's Deputies, which had been included in the October draft, was re-
moved. In Article 100, a sentence replaced the previous detailed
paragraph to say simply that the number of seats to be assigned to
associations would be set forth in the electoral law.
CONCLUSION
Two centuries of struggle on the part of the peoples of the Russian
Empire and of the U.S.S.R. have demonstrated that Western concepts
of constitutionalism have seeped into the consciousness of twentieth-
century Soviet men and women. Models of Western constitutions
have been studied and selections made, but there seems always to have
been evidenced the fear of those who have governed that Jeffersonian-
type democracy would spell chaos were it to be introduced. Increas-
ingly, leaders have expressed the desire to introduce participation by
the common citizen in the policy-making and administrative process.
Yet, various types of controls have been established in constitutional
law.
The last Tsar, when forced by public unrest to grant a "Basic
Law," reserved a royal prerogative to prorogue the Duma, and he used
this right. Lenin established a model in which the sovereignty of the
masses was symbolized by a very large Congress of Soviets, which he
could manipulate through the medium of a monopoly political party
of militant, disciplined, and ideologically committed colleagues.
Winter 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Stalin departed from Lenin's model in 1936 to create a bicameral
legislature patterned on Western federal legislatures, but he controlled
it through his Communist Party, and even wrote into the Constitution
a guiding role for that Party. "Guidance" became "command," and
personalized dictatorship eventually emerged. Nikita Khrushchev,
who succeeded to Stalin's authority after a brief interlude following
Stalin's death in 1953, denounced Stalin's methods but retained the
constitutional structures established in 1936. When Leonid Brezhnev
as Communist Party Secretary General introduced a new constitution
in 1977, he made no change in governmental structures or in Commu-
nist Party "guidance." Indeed, he even clarified that "guidance" role
by a rewording of the 1936 guidance formula.
With his draft of 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev was seen to have used
his authority as successor in the Secretary General role within the
Communist Party to return in considerable measure to the constitu-
tional structures of Lenin's federal Constitution of 1923, but with a
new weighting in favor of the Republics within the federation. Stalin's
highly centralized system had been weakened, but not to the point -
requested by some of the Republics - of creating a confederation.
Central authority was to remain supreme, but there was recognition
that Republics had a right to consultation in emergency situations,
and to referendum votes when there was doubt as to the wisdom of
centrally directed policy.
Further, the new draft included much discussion of the Commu-
nist Party's "guidance" function. No longer was it to enter into the
details of state administration, as had been increasingly manifest in its
activities over the years. It was being directed to return to its policy-
making role alone. Gorbachev seemed to sense that by strengthening
the role of the Soviets as state institutions, the public represented in
those Soviets could keep Party members in the place assigned to them,
even though many deputies were both Party members and Deputies to
the Soviets.
Western analysts and even some Soviet critics have suggested that
"democracy" is being emphasized and measures are being taken to
reduce the likelihood of arbitrary government, with the help of struc-
tures which seem to enhance the potential of resumption of dictatorial
practices. Outsiders can only await developments, hoping that a new
dawn is approaching after nearly two centuries of efforts to create limi-
tations on autocratic power, but fearing that exhortation of masses to
participate in government cannot bring the desired limitation if insti-
tutional structures remain essentially the same as those created in
1923.
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